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Abstract
The banking literature concludes that the performance of client rms deterio-
rates if their distressed main bank reduces the supply of credit. However, these
results rely on the assumption that main banks have an information advantage over
other banks, such that if a client rm changes its main bank, its access to credit
worsens. Using Japanese data from a period including nancial shocks, we show
that rms change the main banking relationship when their main bank becomes
distressed. In addition, the performance of client rms improves after a change in
the main bank relationship. This implies that the availability of credit improves for
these rms, despite the change in main bank.
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1 Introduction
The banking literature concludes that deterioration in bank health has a negative impact
on the performance of client rms (For example Gibson, 1995; Yamori and Murakami,
1999; Kang and Stultz, 2000; Sohn, 2010). For the most part, these studies assume that
main banks have an information advantage over other banks gained through their lending
relationships. If informed main banks are then obliged to decrease lending for whatever
reason, other banks cannot oer sucient credit to these same client rms because of
the information problem. During nancial shocks, as Udell (2009) pointed out, distressed
banks decrease loans to maintain an adequate capital ratio and reduce nonperforming
loans, so client rms face nancial shortages and experience poorer performance. In
Japan, as Hoshi et al. (1991) and Wu and Yao (2012) argue, the relationship between main
banks and their client rms is very close and helps mitigate this information problem. On
this basis, the banking literature suggests that poor bank performance and the changing
of main banks account for the low level of activity and poor performance of Japanese
client rms.
Contrary to the ndings of the banking literature, if the information problems between
client rms and non-main banks are not severe, client rms have an incentive to shift their
main banking relationship from a distressed bank to another bank. Because distressed
banks cannot oer sucient money to maintain an adequate capital ratio, client rms
benet by changing their relationships with distressed banks. In addition, the performance
of client rms improves after the change in main bank because credit availability for the
client rm improves. Importantly, if client rms can switch main bank easily, we observe
that rms will switch their main bank relationship away from a distressed bank. Further,
while some studies (For example, Gibson, 1995; Kang and Stultz, 2000) show that the
performance of Japanese client rms deteriorates if they have a main bank relationship
with a distressed bank using data from the nancial shock of the 1990s, they do not
provide evidence about whether the change in the main bank relationship improves the
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performance of the client rms.
This paper uses Japanese rm-level data from the 1990s to investigate whether client
rms shift their main banking relationship away from distressed banks, and whether the
ex post rm performance of client rms improves after making this change. As many
banks suered problems with nonperforming loans and commensurately reduced loans for
rms following the post-bubble nancial shock, Japanese rm-level data from the 1990s
are appropriate for our study. Moreover, in addition to the relationship between bank
health and rm performance, we investigate whether client rms lock in main banking
relationships with distressed banks, a question not adequately addressed in previous work.
2 Empirical Analysis
2.1 Hypothesis
If, as the banking literature argues, incumbent main banks have an information advantage
over other banks, client rms face severe nancial constraints when they change their
main banking relationship. If this is the case, these rms are unlikely to change their
relationship with the main bank, even if the main bank becomes distressed. This is because
if a client rm changes its main banking relationship, its access to credit worsens. As a
result, client rm performance deteriorates after shifting the main banking relationship
from the distressed bank to another bank. Conversely, if the incumbent main bank does
not specialize in accumulating credit information on its client rms, the client rms benet
from a change in the main banking relationship when their main bank becomes distressed.
In this case, we can observe that client rms change the main banking relationship if
their main bank is distressed.1 In addition, the performance of client rms improves after
changing the main banking relationship because of the concomitant improvement in credit
1Some listed rms can choose to issue bonds or stocks to nance credit demand. To focus on the
banking relationship, we only investigate bank loans.
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availability.
2.2 Data
Many Japanese nancial institutions faced severe diculties with large amounts of non-
performing loans as their assets deteriorated following the bursting of the bubble economy
in the late 1980s. During the 1990s, many nancial institutions went bankrupt because
of the burden of nonperforming loans. We therefore use Japanese listed-rm data from
1993 to 1997. We sample 1,810 listed nonnancial Japanese rms, the data for which we
obtained from the Nikkei Financial Quest database. We identied a rm's main bank
as the private bank that lent it the most each year.2 We omit from our database rms
that have more than one main bank. A proxy of the health of a main bank is the bank's
ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans, which is obtained from the Financial State-
ments of All Banks issued by the Japanese Bankers Association. A bank's nonperforming
loans ratio is dened as the ratio of \Loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy" (hatansaki
saiken) plus \Past due loans" (entai saiken) plus \Restructured loans" (kinri genmen
saiken) to total loans (hereafter NPL3). As some data for regional banks before 1995 are
unavailable, we also use several alternative denitions of the nonperforming loans ratio.
These are the ratio of \Loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy" plus \Past due loans" to
total loans (hereafter NPL2) and the ratio of \Loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy"
to total loans (hereafter NPL1).
2.3 Empirical Strategy
To investigate the hypotheses described in Section 2.1, we estimate the following regres-
sion:
2This denition of the main bank is also used by Kang and Stultz (2000).
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Ex Post F irm Performancei;t+1 = 1Nonperforming Loansi;t + 2Failed Bank Dummyi;t
+ xi;t + Ci;t + ui;t (1)
Ci;t = 1Nonperforming Loansi;t + 2Failed Bank Dummyi;t
+ yi;t + vi;t (2)
Ci;t = 1 if C

i;t > 0
Ci;t = 0 otherwise;
where ui;t  N(0; 2); vi;t  N(0; 2); and Cov(ui;t; vi;t) =  6= 0:
Following Morck et al. (2000), we use Tobin's q in year t+1 as a proxy for Ex Post
F irm Performancei;t+1. The proxies for main bank health are Nonperforming Loansi;t
and Failed Bank Dummyi;t. Nonperforming Loansi;t is the ratio of nonperforming
loans to total loans of a main bank for rm i in year t (dened as NPL1, NPL2 or NPL3).
We also use a dummy variable that equals one if the main bank for rm i in year t is
an ex post failed bank (Failed Bank Dummyi;t).
3 The dummy variable Ci;t takes a
value of one if the name of the main bank for rm i in year t diered from that in year
t+1 (Changing the Main Bank Dummy), and zero otherwise. Ci;t is a latent variable for
the change in the main bank, which is the net benet from changing the main banking
relationship. If Ci;t is greater than zero, rms change the main banking relationship. If
client rms that have a main banking relationship with a distressed bank have an incentive
to change the relationship, the estimated coecients for Nonperforming Loansi;t (NPL1,
NPL2 and NPL3) and Failed Bank Dummyi;t (1; 2) will be positive in equation (2).
3Ex post failed banks in our sample are Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Long-Term Credit Bank of
Japan, Nippon Credit Bank, Hanwa Bank, Tokuyo City Bank, Midori Bank, Fukutoku Bank, Naniwa
Bank, Kokumin Bank, Koufuku Bank, Tokyo Sowa Bank, Namihaya Bank, and Niigata Chuo Bank, all
of which went bankrupt between 1996 and 1999.
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If the performance of the client rms improves after they change their main banking
relationship, the estimated coecient of Ci;t () in equation (1) will be positive and
statistically signicant.
We use a treatment eects model to mitigate endogeneity bias. If the dummy variable
for changing the main bank (Ci;t) is a random variable, the coecient () exhibits the
eects of changing the main bank on client rm performance. However, if our hypotheses
are correct, client rms that have a main banking relationship with a distressed bank are
likely to change their main bank. Therefore, the dummy for changing a main bank is a
nonrandom variable.4 We estimate the parameter vectors using the maximum likelihood
method.
We also specify several control variables (xi;t) in the estimation of rm performance
in equation (1), including assets, leverage, protability, liquidity, main bank dependence,
and the number of lending relationships, along with year and industry dummies5 for each
year t. To start with, we employ the natural log of each rm's total assets as a proxy of
rm scale (size). We include leverage to control for the eects of capital structure, dened
as the ratio of a rm's total debts to total assets. From a theoretical point of view, rm
performance and capital structure are irrelevant. However, some studies suggest that
capital structure could have either positive or negative eects on rm performance, so we
include leverage in our estimation of rm performance. We measure protability using
the ratio of a rm's operating incomes to total assets. As a rule, protable rms are
better performing rms and so each rm's Tobin's q will be higher. We predict that a
rm's protability has a positive eect on rm performance. Firms with higher liquidity
also have better performance because they do not face liquidity constraints. We predict
that liquidity has a positive eect on rm performance and specify the ratio of cash to
total assets as a proxy of liquidity.
4We obtain similar results if we estimate equation (1) using the simple xed eects model and equation
(2) using the logit model.
5We generate 28 industry dummies using the \Shoken code" for each rm.
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The number of lending relationships with banks is the number of banks that oer
loans for rm i in year t. According to Detragiache et al. (2000), as rms with a large
number of relationships are less likely to face liquidity problems, the number of lending
relationships has a positive eect on rm performance. Main bank dependence is the
ratio of loans obtained from the main bank to total loans. According to Rajan (1992),
a close main bank relationship causes the holdup problem. As a result, the performance
of client rms that depend more on their main bank is lower. Conversely, a close main
bank relationship can enhance credit availability for these client rms. Overall, the bank
dependence should then have some eect on rm performance, but the predicted sign is
ambiguous. We also include proxies for nonperforming loans and a failed bank dummy
in equation (1). As Gibson (1995) nds that the deterioration of main bank health has
a negative eect on client rm performance, we predict that the performance eects of
nonperforming loans and the failed bank dummy will be negative.
Following Ongena and Smith (2001), we specify rm scale, leverage, protability and
the number of lending relationships with banks in year t as control variables (yi;t) in
equation (2). In addition, we use liquidity, main bank dependence in year t, and year and
industry dummies as control variables. Our justication is as follows. Larger-sized rms
are more informationally transparent rms, so they may nd it easier to change their
main bank relationship. We predict that the eect of rm scale is positive for a change
in main bank. Highly leveraged rms are dependent on banks, so they are more likely to
lock in their main bank. The estimated coecient for leverage should be negative given
the change in main bank dummy. Conversely, highly leveraged rms are risky for banks,
so main banks decrease credit supply for these rms. If this eect is greater, leveraged
rms are more likely obliged to change their main bank, so the coecient for leverage
should be negative for the change in main bank dummy. We predict that leverage has
either positive or negative eects on the dummy variable for the change in main bank.6
6Ongena and Smith (2001) provide evidence that highly leveraged rms are more likely to change
their primary bank.
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Protable rms can also change their main bank relationship more easily, so protability
has a positive eect on the dummy variable for the change in main bank. Firms with
higher liquidity are less likely to default, so they may also nd it easier to change the
relationship with a main bank. Firms with a larger number of lending relationships do
not face a lock-in problem with their main bank. As they can easily change their main
bank relationship, we predict that the number of relationships has a positive eect on the
change in main bank. Alternatively, if the information problem is not severe for banks
lacking strong relationships with rms, the eects of the number of lending relationships
can be negative or statistically insignicant. Firms that depend more on their main bank
are also less likely to switch main bank, so the eects of bank dependence should be
negative.
We use the natural log of total loans from the main bank as an instrumental variable.
Firms that borrow large sums from their main bank cannot change the main banking
relationship easily, because only a few (especially large) banks can oer large loans to
substitute for the role of the main bank. Therefore, the size of loans from the main bank
negatively correlates with the dummy for changing the main banking relationship. This
variable is mainly determined by rm size, so it is not considered to be correlated with
rm performance and ui;t.
2.4 Results
We provide summary statistics for our variables in Table 1. The average for \Changing the
Main Bank" shows that 7.1% of the sample rms changed their main banking relationship.
The column headed \Change" is limited to the subsample of rms that changed their main
banking relationship, while the column headed \No Change" is limited to client rms that
did not change their main banking relationship. As shown, the means of NPL1, NPL2
and NPL3 in the \Change" group are large, suggesting that the main banks of rms
that changed their main banking relationship had large amounts of nonperforming loans.
7
The rm scale, leverage, main bank dependence and number of lending relationships are
smaller and statistically signicant for rms that changed their main banking relationship
than for those that did not. In contrast, the protability and liquidity of rms that
changed their main banking relationship are larger and statistically signicant.
[Table 1 About Here]
Table 2 provides the estimation results for equations (1) and (2). We simultaneously
estimate columns (1) and (4), columns (2) and (5) and columns (3) and (6) using the
treatment eects model. Columns (1){(3) detail the results of equation (2). As shown, the
estimated coecients for NPL1, NPL2 and NPL3 in columns (1){(3) are all positive and
statistically signicant at the 1% level. These suggest that client rms are likely to change
their main banking relationship if their main bank has a large amount of nonperforming
loans. In addition, the estimated coecients for the failed bank dummy are positive and
statistically signicant at the 1% level. In sum, our results suggest that client rms are
more likely to change their main banking relationship if their main bank is distressed.
We provide the estimation results for equation (1) in columns (4){(6). As shown, the
coecients for changing the main bank are all positive and statistically signicant at the
1% level. These results suggest that a client rm's performance (in terms of Tobin's q)
improves after it changes its main banking relationship. Apart from protability, the signs
on the estimated coecients for the control variables are consistent with our predictions.
[Table 2 About Here]
2.5 Causes of Improving Firm Performance
We nd that rms that have a main bank relationship with a distressed bank are more
likely to switch to a new main bank. This means that rms prefer not to have relationships
with distressed main banks. Interestingly, after switching their main bank relationship,
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the performance of client rms improves. This suggests that the new main bank can oer
sucient credit for client rms because any information problems are not severe for the
new main bank. To check the availability of credit improves for client rms after the
change in main bank relationship, we regress the change in main bank dummy on the
annual change in total borrowings and interest payments. We then estimate equations
(1) and (2) using the rm's total growth in borrowings [(total borrowings in year t+1 {
total borrowings in year t)/total borrowings in year t] and the annual change in interest
payments normalized by the amount of total borrowings [(interest payments in year t+1
{ interest payments in year t)/total borrowings in year t]7 as a dependent variable in
equation (1).
The results are shown in Table 3. As shown, the estimated coecient for the change
in main bank dummy given the change in interest payments is negative and statistically
signicant at the 1% level, implying that a client rm's cost of borrowing decreases after it
changes its main banking relationship. In contrast, the coecient for the change in main
bank dummy given growth in total borrowings is positive, but not statistically signicant.
These results imply that credit availability for client rms improves after the change in
their main bank relationship because they can retain the existing level of borrowing but
also reduce the cost of borrowing. These results are inconsistent with our prediction
that the new main bank cannot oer sucient credit because the incumbent main bank
has an information advantage. These results correspond with the results when we employ
Tobin's q as a proxy for rm performance. 8 Our results then show that client rms change
their relationship with a distressed bank to improve credit availability. Subsequently, the
performance of client rms improves because of the enhancement in credit availability.
[Table 3 About Here]
7These variables include outliers, so we truncate the data at the 1st and the 99th percentiles of the
sample.
8However, as the estimated  is statistically insignicant when using total borrowings growth as the
dependent variable, the results in column (1) are not robust.
9
The results for the control variables show that highly leveraged and protable rms,
rms with greater liquidity, and rms with a larger number of lending relationships display
decreased levels of borrowing. The cost of borrowing (interest) also increases in less cred-
itworthy rms (that is, in highly leveraged rms and rms with low levels of protability).
In addition, the eects of nonperforming loans and the failed bank dummy for interest
payments are positive. This suggests that distressed banks impose higher rates on their
loans because these banks (generally those with higher credit risk) are only able to raise
funds at correspondingly higher rates. Overall, the estimates for the control variables are
reasonable and consistent with common intuition.
3 Conclusion
We investigate the empirical relationship between the change in the main banking rela-
tionship and client rm performance (in terms of Tobin's q) using Japanese rm-level data
from the 1990s. Our ndings are as follows. First, we nd that client rms were likely
to change their main banking relationship if their main bank suered from the burden
of nonperforming loans and went bankrupt during the 1990s. Second, we nd that client
rm performance improved after changing the main banking relationship. The banking
literature suggests that credit availability for client rms worsens when their main bank
becomes distressed because they are locked into the main banking relationship; as a result,
the performance of these rms decreases. In contrast, our results show that client rms
can change their relationship with a distressed main bank to improve their performance
because of decrease in the borrowing cost. In addition, our ndings suggest that client
rms are not actually locked into a main banking relationship with distressed banks.
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Table 2: Estimation Results of Treatment Eects Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Changing the Main Bank Firm Performance
(Tobin's q)
Changing the Main Bank 0.5949 0.5957 0.5924
(0.0209) (0.0212) (0.0294)
NPL1 25.3136 {4.5621
(4.5829) (1.3284)
NPL2 7.1017 {1.0973
(1.2424) (0.3425)
NPL3 4.6923 {1.0422
(0.9749) (0.2738)
Failed Bank Dummy 0.4077 0.3878 0.5079 {0.0824 {0.0770 {0.0478
(0.0890) (0.0922) (0.1347) (0.0249) (0.0259) (0.0396)
Firm Scale 0.0769 0.0830 0.0791 {0.0148 {0.0141 0.0067
(0.0270) (0.0276) (0.0385) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0075)
Leverage 0.3386 0.3135 0.1282 0.4120 0.4122 0.5619
(0.1496) (0.1552) (0.2174) (0.0311) (0.0320) (0.0432)
Protability {0.0810 {0.1057 {1.4700 1.8443 1.8996 2.7867
(0.6329) (0.6661) (0.9189) (0.1401) (0.1463) (0.2070)
Liquidity 0.6790 0.8133 1.0460 0.0951 0.0362 0.1153
(0.2613) (0.2787) (0.3995) (0.0662) (0.0699) (0.1000)
Number of {0.0268 {0.0264 {0.0273 0.0002 0.0001 0.0007
Lending Relationships (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0083) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0012)
Main Bank Dependence {1.4468 {1.3279 {1.7537 0.3193 0.3192 0.2916
(0.1687) (0.1731) (0.2677) (0.0355) (0.0370) (0.0520)
Ln (Amount of Loans {0.1610 {0.1504 {0.1474
from Main Bank) (0.0241) (0.0248) (0.0348)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,320 6,798 3,273 7,320 6,798 3,273
Log Likelihood {5310.4 {4864.3 {2325.2
Estimated  {0.722 {0.732 {0724
Note: This Table provides estimates of treatment eects model with the changing the main bank dummy
and rm performance (Tobin's q) as dependent variables. We describe the denitions of all variables in
Section 2.3.  represents signicance at the 10% level,  at the 5% level and  at the 1% level.
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Table 3: Estimation Results of Treatment Eects Model Using Total Borrowings and
Interest Payments
(1) (2)
Total Borrowings Change in Interest
Growth Payments
Changing the Main Bank 0.0556 {0.0251
(0.049) (0.002)
NPL1 1.2167 0.1241
(1.084) (0.068)
Failed Bank Dummy {0.0315 0.0031
(0.020) (0.001)
Firm Scale {0.0024 {0.0029
(0.004) (0.000)
Leverage {0.0523 0.0086
(0.025) (0.002)
Protability {0.6131 {0.0414
(0.112) (0.007)
Liquidity {0.0014 0.0002
(0.001) (0.000)
Number of {0.2807 {0.0104
Lending Relationships (0.053) (0.003)
Main Bank Dependence 0.0356 {0.0175
(0.030) (0.002)
Year Dummy Yes Yes
Industry Dummy Yes Yes
Observations 7,247 7,170
Log Likelihood {4051.5 16065.8
Estimated  {0.093 0.538
Note: This Table provides estimates of treatment eects model with the rm's total growth in borrowings
(column (1)) and the annual change in interest payments normalized by the amount of total borrowings
(column (2)) as dependent variables. We estimate the changing the main bank dummy as an endogenous
variable. We describe the denitions of all variables in Section 2.3.  represents signicance at the 10%
level,  at the 5% level and  at the 1% level. The total growth in borrowings and the annual change
in interest payments include outliers, so we truncate the data at the 1st and the 99th percentiles of the
sample.
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